Why Self-Report Measures of Self-Control and Inhibition Tasks Do Not Substantially Correlate by Wennerhold, Lasse Henning & Friese, Malte
PERSPECTIVE/OPINION
Why Self-Report Measures of Self-Control and Inhibition 
Tasks Do Not Substantially Correlate
Lasse Wennerhold and Malte Friese
Trait self-control is often defined as the ability to inhibit dominant responses including thoughts, 
emotions, and behavioral impulses. Despite the pivotal role of inhibition for trait self-control, a growing 
body of evidence found small-to-zero correlations between self-report measures of trait self-control and 
behavioral inhibition tasks. These observations seem puzzling considering that both types of measures 
are often seen as operationalizations of the same or at least closely related theoretical constructs. 
Previous explanations for this non-correspondence focused on psychometric properties of the measures. 
Here, we discuss three further factors that may explain the empirical non-correspondence between trait 
self-control scales and behavioral inhibition tasks: (1) the distinction between typical and maximum 
performance, (2) the measurement of single versus repeated performance, and (3) differences between 
impulses in different domains. Specifically, we argue that a) self-report measures of trait self-control are 
designed to assess typical performance, and relative to these, behavioral inhibition tasks are designed to 
assess maximum performance; b) self-report measures of trait self-control capture central tendencies of 
aggregates of many different instances of behavior, whereas behavioral inhibition tasks are momentary, 
one-time state measures; and c) most self-report measures of trait self-control are designed to measure 
general, cross-domain inhibition, whereas behavioral inhibition tasks also measure narrower, domain-
specific inhibition to a substantial degree. In conclusion, we argue that it is implausible to hypothesize 
more than a low correlation between self-report measures of trait self-control and behavioral inhibition 
tasks as they genuinely focus on different aspects of the theoretical construct of self-control. We 
also discuss the broader implications of these issues for self-control as a theoretical construct and its 
appropriate measurement.
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Consider the following scenario: A researcher employs 
two different measurement instruments designed to 
measure the same construct. To her surprise, she ends 
up with a low correlation between the two measures. A 
different researcher does the same thing with slightly 
different measures – again, almost no correlation 
between the measures. How is this possible? These 
(non-)correlations require an explanation.
In recent years, a situation akin to the one described 
in the previous paragraph has emerged in the field of 
self-control. A growing body of evidence found small-
to-zero correlations between self-report measures of 
trait self-control and behavioral inhibition tasks (Allom, 
Panetta, Mullan, & Hagger, 2016; Duckworth & Kern, 
2011; Eisenberg et al., 2019; Nęcka, Gruszka, Orzechowski, 
Nowak, & Wójcik, 2018; Saunders, Milyavskaya, Etz, 
Randles, & Inzlicht, 2018). For example, Saunders et al. 
(2018) published a series of studies suggesting that trait 
self-control and inhibitory control are not meaningfully 
associated. Trait self-control was assessed with the most 
prominent self-report measure in the field (i.e., the Self-
Control Scale, Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004); 
inhibitory control was assessed with two established 
executive function tasks (i.e., the Stroop task, Stroop, 
1935, and the Flanker task, Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) that 
are commonly used to assess inhibitory control (e.g., 
Diamond, 2013). An internal Bayesian meta-analysis 
across 5 studies (overall N > 2,600) revealed a null 
relationship between the two types of measures. Similar 
results emerged for other constructs closely related to 
trait self-control, for example, conscientiousness and 
impulsivity (Edmonds, Bogg, & Roberts, 2009; Eisenberg 
et al., 2019; Enkavi et al., 2019; Fleming, Heintzelmann, 
& Bartholow, 2016; Frey, Pedroni, Mata, Rieskamp, & 
Hertwig, 2017; Stahl et al., 2014).
These empirical observations seem puzzling. 
After all, self-report measures of trait self-control 
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and behavioral inhibition tasks are often seen as 
operationalizations of the same or at least closely related 
theoretical constructs. They are designed with the 
intention to capture the ability of a person to inhibit 
dominant responses including thoughts, emotions, and 
behavioral impulses (Tangney et al., 2004). This ability 
is classically considered the central definitional aspect 
of the construct of self-control (e.g., Baumeister, 2014; 
Duckworth & Kern, 2011; Hofmann, Schmeichel, & 
Baddeley, 2012). Thus, it would seem appropriate to expect 
moderate or even strong correlations between these 
measures. When we talk about self-control in this article, 
we also refer to this conceptualization of the construct.
Saunders et al. (2018) discuss three factors that might 
contribute to this seeming conundrum. First, the Self-
Control Scale (Tangney et al., 2004) might capture other 
things than inhibition alone (e.g., items like “I am able 
to work effectively toward long-term goals”, “I engage in 
healthy practices”) while the focus of behavioral inhibition 
tasks is much narrower. Second, behavioral inhibition 
tasks are often selected for little between-subject 
variability, which limits their ability to assess between-
person differences and correlate with other individual 
difference measures (reliability paradox, Enkavi et al., 
2019; Hedge, Powell, & Sumner, 2018; Rouder, Kumar, & 
Haaf, 2019). Third, previous meta-analytic estimates of 
the relationship between self-report measures of trait self-
control and behavioral inhibition tasks (e.g., Duckworth 
& Kern, 2011) may have overestimated the relationship 
due to publication bias (which does not explain the low 
correlations, but the surprise about them).
We agree with all three arguments Saunders et al. (2018) 
consider to explain the observed negligible correlations 
between measures of trait self-control and inhibition. 
In the present article, we offer three further factors not 
addressed by Saunders et al. (2018) that may explain this 
empirical non-correspondence. From our perspective, 
considering these factors is important for two reasons: 
First, they help to explain a series of seemingly surprising 
empirical findings (Allom et al., 2016; Duckworth & 
Kern, 2011; Eisenberg et al., 2019; Nęcka et al., 2018; 
Saunders et al., 2018). Second, despite them being rarely 
considered in the self-control literature, we believe that 
these issues are of broader relevance as they help to 
distinguish between trait self-control as a construct and 
its operationalization by measurement instruments. The 
first issue is the distinction between typical and maximum 
performance; the second refers to the measurement of 
single versus repeated performance; the third relates to 
differences between impulses in different domains.
Because of these issues, we argue that it is not plausible 
to hypothesize more than a low correlation between 
self-report measures of trait self-control and behavioral 
inhibition tasks, even if a) the respective self-report 
measure of trait self-control would measure inhibitory 
processes alone and b) the behavioral inhibition 
tasks would show high retest reliability in measuring 
between-person differences. Putting psychometric 
issues aside, both measurement approaches genuinely 
focus on different aspects of the theoretical construct of 
self-control. While most self-report measures of trait self-
control are designed to assess trait-like typical inhibitory 
performance that is repeatedly shown across a broad 
range of impulses from different domains, behavioral 
inhibition tasks are designed to measure ability-like 
maximum inhibitory performance shown on single 
occasions for specific kinds of impulses.
Note that we use the wording “self-report measures 
of trait self-control” and “behavioral inhibition tasks” 
to refer to methodological categories of operationali-
zations: self-report questionnaires on the one hand 
and performance tasks on the other hand. We do 
this to stress the point that, although we refer to the 
Self-Control Scale and the Stroop/Flanker tasks as 
prominent examples of their respective methodological 
categories following the example of Saunders et al. 
(2018), most issues raised in this article do not only 
pertain to the Self-Control Scale and the Stroop/Flanker 
tasks specifically, but their respective methodological 
categories more generally. When discussing issues that 
refer to the Self-Control Scale or the Stroop/Flanker 
tasks as specific operationali zations, we name them 
directly as “the Self-Control Scale” or “the Stroop/Flanker 
task”. In general, we refer to the level of self-control 
measurement when not directly stating that we refer 
to the theoretical construct level of self-control. We do 
not discuss which methodological approach towards the 
measurement of self-control, self-report questionnaires 
or performance tasks, may generally be preferable as a 
benchmark measure of self-control.
Typical versus maximum self-control performance
In industrial and organizational psychology, there exists 
the well-established distinction between typical and 
maximum performance (Sackett, Zedeck, & Fogli, 1988). 
Typical performance refers to the tendency to perform 
relatively consistently at some level across different 
situations over a prolonged period of time. By contrast, 
maximum performance refers to the ability to perform at 
the highest possible level on a specific occasion. Although 
typical and maximum performance are not independent, 
they correlate only moderately (for a meta-analysis, see 
Beus & Whitman, 2012).
The distinction between typical and maximum 
performance nicely maps onto the distinction between 
self-report measures of trait self-control and behavioral 
inhibition tasks. The instruction of the Self-Control Scale 
(Tangney et al., 2004) asks respondents to “[…] indicate 
how much each of the following statements reflects how 
you typically are” (emphasis added, p. 323), thus clearly 
asking about respondents’ typical behavior rather than 
their maximum ability. This also pertains to the wording 
of many of the scale’s items that make clear that what 
respondents are asked for is typical behavior rather than 
maximum ability (e.g., “I am lazy”). Similar observations 
apply to other self-report measures of trait self-control; 
they are designed to assess typical thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviors of respondents.
Consistent with the notion that the Self-Control Scale 
assesses typical rather than maximum performance, 
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growing evidence suggests that the plentiful associations 
of the Self-Control Scale with desirable life outcomes are 
to a large extent due to beneficial stable habits, not due to 
effortful inhibition in particular situations (e.g., de Ridder 
et al., 2012; Galla & Duckworth, 2015; Grund & Carstens, 
2019; Hofmann, Baumeister, Förster, & Vohs, 2012). In 
other words, it is not mainly individual differences in 
maximum performance, but in typical performance that 
differentiates between respondents on this scale.
If we assume a continuum between typical performance 
on one end and maximum performance on the other 
end, behavioral inhibition tasks are clearly designed to 
assess behavior more on the maximum performance end 
of the continuum compared to self-report instruments 
such as the Self-Control Scale. In behavioral inhibition 
tasks, respondents are instructed to avoid making errors 
and/or to try being fast in the task that is to follow. 
Nothing suggests to participants that what the researchers 
seek to measure is something akin to how they typically 
behave. Rather, the context makes it clear that what 
counts is a performance that is as good as possible.
Admittedly, many people might not be maximally 
motivated and thus might not show their absolute 
maximum performance on behavioral inhibition tasks 
when they take part in a scientific study. Thus, provided 
strong enough incentives it may be possible to improve 
performance beyond baseline levels. The point that 
we make here is that there is a pronounced difference 
between self-report measures of trait self-control and 
behavioral inhibition tasks. Self-report instruments 
are designed to measure something clearly more on the 
side of typical performance and behavioral inhibition 
tasks are designed to measure something clearly more 
on the side of maximum performance.
The distinction between typical and maximum 
performance has not been picked up in the self-
control literature to a great extent. One exception 
is a study by Freudenthaler and Neubauer (2007) in 
the domain of emotion management, an important 
aspect of self-control (see also Neçka et al., 2018). 
Typical and maximum emotion management 
performance were measured between participants. 
Their correspondence could therefore not be assessed. 
However, the authors found that self-reported typical 
emotion management performance was less optimal 
than maximum performance. In addition, self-reported 
typical emotion management varied more strongly 
between persons than maximum performance. In 
other words, most participants were aware of adequate 
emotion management strategies that should optimally 
be used (maximum performance), but not all of them 
reported typically employing them in the relevant 
situations. This suggests that typical performance 
might be a more reliable indicator of between-person 
differences compared to maximum performance. This 
corresponds to the discussion about the reliability 
paradox mentioned previously, that is, the selection 
of behavioral inhibition tasks and other executive 
function tasks for little instead of ample between-person 
differences (Enkavi et al., 2019; Hedge et al., 2018).
Taken together, the distinction between typical and 
maximum performance helps to explain low correlations 
between self-report measures of trait self-control and 
behavioral inhibition tasks because (1) self-report 
measures such as the Self-Control Scale (Tangney et al., 
2004) are designed to assess typical performance, and 
behavioral inhibition tasks are designed to assess 
maximum performance, (2) typical and maximum 
performance are conceptually different and empirically 
only modestly related, and (3) maximum performance 
measures might show comparatively little between-
person variability, limiting their ability to correlate 
with other individual differences. Note that we are 
not claiming that the distinction between typical and 
maximum performance is the factor that explains low 
correlations between self-report measures of trait 
self-control and behavioral inhibition tasks. In fact, 
the moderate associations between the two types of 
performance (Beus & Whitman, 2012) would still predict 
a discernable correlation. Nevertheless, this distinction 
is one factor worth considering to understand why self-
report measures of trait self-control and behavioral 
inhibition tasks show small-to-zero correlations.
We believe that the implications of the distinction 
between typical and maximum performance go beyond 
the explanation of low correlations between self-report 
measures of trait self-control and behavioral inhibition 
tasks. One implication refers to the measurement of 
trait self-control. A seminal definition describes traits 
as “[…] individual differences in tendencies to show 
consistent patterns of thoughts, feelings, and actions” 
(McCrae & Costa, 2003, p. 25, see also Roberts, 2009; 
Roberts & Jackson, 2008). The typical versus maximum 
distinction highlights that having the ability to perform 
at a certain maximum level does not imply the tendency 
to consistently live up to this ability. Thus, when 
measurement instruments seek to assess trait self-control 
they should focus on relatively consistent tendencies to 
show self-control, not on maximum ability. In other cases, 
researchers may specifically conceptualize self-control 
as an ability or specify different dimensions of self-
control, some of which might refer to ability aspects of 
the construct and others to trait-like aspects, and measure 
them separately.
A second implication refers to associations between 
measures of self-control and outcome variables. Behaving 
in a self-controlled way is not particularly hard for most 
situations prototypically seen as self-control dilemmas. 
Yes, some impulses are stronger than others, but in 
principle, most persons are able to eat an apple instead of 
a chocolate bar or work instead of checking social media 
in any specific situation. Whether or not they do so will 
likely have little impact on their overall success in life. 
That is not to say that single acts of behavior may not have 
profound impacts on people’s lives. However, desirable 
life outcomes that are associated with trait self-control 
such as academic achievement, financial wealth, health, 
or stable social relationships (Moffitt et al., 2011; Tangney 
et al., 2004), are usually the result of “doing the right 
thing” most of the time over extended periods of time, not 
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in single situations. In other words, what differentiates 
people with high versus low trait self-control and helps 
them to achieve a multitude of desirable life outcomes 
over months, years, and decades is that people with 
high trait self-control tend to typically act in a more self-
controlled manner.
Single versus repeated performance
The observation that relative to self-report instruments 
such as the Self-Control Scale behavioral inhibition tasks 
assess something more akin to maximum performance 
can partly explain the low correspondence between these 
variables. However, even if one would assume that, on 
average, participants in scientific studies show so little 
motivation to perform well on behavioral inhibition tasks 
that these tasks do not work as measures of maximum 
performance at all, they would likely make relatively poor 
trait measures. The reason is that any measurement of 
inhibition would remain a momentary, one-time, state 
measure of inhibitory performance that would be heavily 
influenced by situational factors and likely be unreliable 
as an indicator of this person’s typical performance. By 
contrast, self-report instruments that ask about typical 
behavior like the Self-Control scale provoke responses 
that are central tendencies of aggregates of many different 
instances of behavior and are therefore more likely to 
reliably grasp trait levels.
In his seminal contributions to the person-situation 
debate, Fleeson (2001, 2004) discovered that personality 
traits are characterized by strong intraindividual 
variability. That is, a moderately self-controlled person 
does not behave in a moderately self-controlled way all 
the time (Figure 1A). Instead, there are many instances in 
which this person behaves in a more or less self-controlled 
way than at a moderate level (Figure 1B).1 What justifies 
calling this person moderately self-controlled is that 
on average across many different situations the central 
tendency of this person’s behavior is relatively stable at 
a moderate level of self-control (Figure 1C), compared to 
that of others. For example, the average self-control level 
of a person during a certain time period (e.g., one week) 
tends to be similar to this person’s average self-control 
level during another time period (e.g., the following 
week). This led Fleeson to conclude that traits are density 
distributions of states such as those depicted in Figure 1. 
Thus, there is strong variability within persons, but also 
high stability of the central tendencies between persons. 
This intriguing insight effectively resolved a good part 
of the person-situation debate that kept social and 
personality psychologists busy for decades (Fleeson & 
Jayawickreme, 2015).
We regard inhibition as a personality trait. Figure 1B 
illustrates that a one-shot behavioral measurement of 
inhibition is unlikely to reflect the central tendency of a 
person. For behavioral inhibition tasks to indicate typical 
performance they would need to be applied multiple 
times in different circumstances, ideally in participants’ 
daily lives via ecological momentary assessment (see 
Shiffman, Stone, & Hufford, 2008, for an overview) to 
increase external validity. The result would be a density 
distribution of inhibition states, the central tendency 
of which would be a more reliable indicator of typical 
inhibition (that is, the trait). This indicator should correlate 
more substantially with any other measure indicating 
typical inhibition performance than single-shot measures 
of the same construct.
Inhibition of different kinds of impulses
Another factor that may contribute to explaining the 
null relationship between self-report measures of trait 
self-control and behavioral inhibition tasks is that both 
measures differ in the range of impulses that are inhibited 
in different domains they focus on. Specifically, we argue 
that self-report measures of trait self-control typically 
Figure 1: Each graph depicts the number of times a hypothetical person acted at each level of self-control. The graph on 
the left (A) depicts the density distribution of self-controlled behavior with on average moderate level of self-control 
and relatively low intraindividual variability (i.e, this fictitious person almost always behaved in a moderately self-
controlled way). The graph in the middle (B) also depicts the density distribution of a self-controlled behavior with 
on average moderate level of self-control, this time with relatively high intraindividual variability (i.e., this fictitious 
person often behaves considerably more or less self-controlled than on a moderate level). Fleeson (2001) found that 
actual distributions more resemble Figure 1B than Figure 1A. In Figure 1C, each point in this graph represents one 
person’s average level of self-control in two different time periods (e.g., one week). The work by Fleeson (2001, 2004) 
suggests that how self-controlled a person acts on average in one time period is highly similar to how self-controlled 
the person acts on average in another time period. Figure adapted from Fleeson (2004).
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measure general, cross-domain inhibition, whereas 
behavioral inhibition tasks measure also narrower, 
domain-specific inhibition to a substantial degree.
The role of potential qualitative differences of impulses 
in different domains is rarely discussed in the self-
control literature (e.g., an impulse to eat unhealthy food 
versus an impulse to insult someone in an argument). 
As a consequence, a naive reader of the literature might 
assume that there are few qualitative differences between 
impulses across domains and that people are typically 
able to inhibit impulses in different domains to roughly 
the same extent. Domain-general measures of trait self-
control – like the Self-Control Scale (Tangney et al., 2004) 
– predict a wide range of desirable life outcomes across 
different domains (e.g., de Ridder et al., 2012; Tangney et 
al., 2004). It is therefore indeed plausible that there are 
causes of self-control performance that might be common 
across domains. At the same time, a growing literature 
advances theoretical arguments and/or provides empirical 
evidence suggesting that there are noteworthy differences 
between domain-general and domain-specific self-
control (de Ridder et al., 2012; Duckworth & Tsukayama, 
2015; Eisenberg et al., 2019; Haws, Davis, & Dholakia, 
2016; Roberts, Lejuez, Krueger, Richards, & Hill, 2014). 
For example, Haws et al. (2016) report only moderate 
correlations between the Self-Control Scale (Tangney 
et al., 2004) and domain-specific adaptations of this scale 
for spending and eating behavior. To be successful in a 
given domain, people likely need domain-general self-
control plus domain-specific skills.
In their meta-analysis of the associations of different 
self-report measures of trait self-control with behavior 
in various life domains, de Ridder et al. (2012) found 
substantial variability of these relationships across 
domains. Thus, it seems plausible that people differ in their 
domain-specific self-control across domains. This could 
be due to a) differences between impulses in different 
domains that make – on average – impulses feel stronger 
in one domain than in another (i.e., a bottom-up process) 
or b) due to differences in the capacity to inhibit impulses 
across different domains (i.e., a top-down process). The 
Self-Control Scale is conceptualized as an instrument to 
indicate the strength of the inhibitory top-down process 
and does not distinguish between these different aspects.
Admittedly, it is a matter of debate to what extent the 
Self-Control Scale measures the inhibition of impulses 
alone, whether domain-general or domain-specific. 
Likely, it measures also other, and even a broad array 
of processes. This is one of the points Saunders et al. 
(2018) made to explain the zero-correlation between the 
scale and behavioral inhibition tasks. It is also currently 
unknown to what extent the inhibition of impulses per 
se is conducive to the relationships of the Self-Control 
Scale with real-life outcomes. The point here is that even 
if the Self-Control Scale measured general, cross-domain 
inhibition alone (which is what it is intended to do) we 
should not expect particularly strong correlations with 
behavioral inhibition tasks (e.g., Stroop task, Flanker task).
We noted doubts about the validity of the Self-Control 
scale as a (more or less) pure measure of domain-general 
inhibition. Similarly, the validity of behavioral inhibition 
tasks as pure measures of inhibition can be questioned. 
Whether performance on these tasks is determined by 
inhibitory control alone or other processes as well, for 
example, selective attention, is not entirely clear (Cohen, 
Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990; Egner & Hirsch, 2005). This 
notwithstanding, these tasks arguably measure inhibition 
to a substantial degree and are commonly used as 
measures of inhibition. Thus, one should expect at least 
a moderate correlation of these measures with a self-
report scale that measures inhibition if both approaches 
captured similar inhibitory processes.
Behavioral inhibition tasks are meant to assess domain-
general inhibition as well. It is not clear, however, to what 
extent they actually achieve this goal. We argue that these 
tasks substantially measure the inhibition of rather specific 
kinds of impulses as well. For instance, in the Stroop task 
reading a written word evokes an impulse to indicate the 
lexical meaning of that word. As respondents are given a 
different task, namely to indicate the physical color of a 
written word, they have to overcome the impulse to refer 
to the lexical meaning when physical color and lexical 
meaning are incompatible. This task clearly involves some 
kind of inhibition. However, we deem it implausible to 
assume that inhibiting to name the lexical meaning of 
a word in split-second decision making is qualitatively 
identical to the kind of inhibition that is required when 
inhibiting other impulses from other domains (e.g., 
resisting a palatable chocolate bar or resisting to insult 
another person in a heated discussion). In other words, 
although the Stroop task (and other behavioral inhibition 
tasks for that matter) may appear to be domain-general 
measures of inhibition due to their affectively cold and 
abstract content and design, it likely captures substantial 
aspects of inhibitory control that are specific to these 
particular contents and that may not easily generalize 
to the inhibition of impulses from real life domains. 
The more task-specific inhibition is captured by these 
tasks, the more their capacity to predict outcomes across 
domains would be compromised. Indeed, this reasoning 
is in line with recent empirical evidence finding very low 
correlations between executive function measures and 
various life outcomes (e.g., Eisenberg et al., 2019).
One possible solution to this problem is to assess a 
variety of different inhibition tasks and model a latent 
variable that indicates general, cross-domain inhibition 
(e.g., Miyake & Friedman, 2012; Miyake et al., 2000). 
The resulting latent variable would represent the shared 
variance between the different measures and thereby 
reflect more general inhibitory ability. In line with our 
reasoning, studies that model a latent inhibition variable 
based on different inhibition tasks (e.g., Stroop, Stop-
Signal, Antisaccade) often find relatively low standardized 
factor loadings ranging in the .30s to .50s, indicating that 
despite their similarities these tasks assess substantial 
task-specific aspects (Miyake & Friedman, 2012; Miyake 
et al., 2000).
To the extent that the Self-Control Scale or other self-
report measures of trait self-control capture general 
inhibitory ability, a latent variable approach would 
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increase measurement correspondence between these 
scales and (the latent variable of) inhibition. Measurement 
correspondence has been widely discussed in other fields. 
For example, the seminal correspondence principle by 
Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) suggests that the relation 
between measures of attitudes and behavior increases with 
increasing correspondence between the measurement 
instruments across different entities (e.g., target, action, 
context, time). Strong attitude-behavior relations can only 
be expected when there is high correspondence between 
at least some of these entities. Applied to the present 
context, a higher correspondence between the types of 
inhibition – general versus domain-specific – assessed 
by self-report measures and the indicator of inhibition 
derived from behavioral inhibition tasks should increase 
their empirical correlation.
Taken together, we argue that domain-general self-
report measures of trait self-control (e.g., the Self-Control 
Scale), and behavioral inhibition tasks (e.g., Stroop, 
Flanker) might measure the inhibition of different types 
of impulses varying in specificity. Self-report measures 
typically measure the inhibition of a broad array of 
impulses while behavioral inhibition tasks might measure 
(among other things) domain-general inhibition, but also 
to a substantial degree the inhibition of narrower task-
specific impulses that are not representative of impulses 
encountered in various domains of daily life. Again, 
we do not claim that this issue is the factor explaining 
the lack of correspondence between both types of 
measures. It is plausible that there are common aspects 
of inhibition across domains, and this should lead to 
a moderate correlation if this factor would be the only 
relevant issue. However, the issue might be one of several 
factors explaining the empirical non-correlation between 
self-report measures of trait self-control and behavioral 
inhibition tasks.
Conclusion
We discussed three issues that might explain the empirical 
small-to-zero relationship between self-report measures 
of trait self-control and behavioral inhibition tasks found 
by a growing number of studies (e.g., Saunders et al., 
2018; Nęcka et al., 2018): the distinction between typical 
versus maximum performance, the distinction between 
single versus repeated performance, and the relevance 
of considering different kinds of impulses. Bearing 
these issues in mind, we argue that it is implausible to 
hypothesize more than a low correlation between self-
report measures of trait self-control and behavioral 
inhibition tasks even if a) the respective self-report 
measure of trait self-control would measure inhibitory 
processes alone and b) the inhibition-related measures 
of executive function would show high retest reliability 
in measuring between-person differences. Beyond 
psychometric issues, both approaches genuinely focus on 
distinct facets of the theoretical construct of self-control. 
Most self-report measures of trait self-control are designed 
to assess trait-like typical inhibitory performance that 
is repeatedly shown across a broad range of impulses 
from different domains. Behavioral inhibition tasks, 
by contrast, are typically designed to measure ability-
like maximum inhibitory performance shown on single 
occasions for more specific kinds of impulses. Future 
theoretical and empirical research should examine more 
closely which of the discussed (and possibly additional) 
factors contribute to which extent to the degree of 
empirical (non-)correspondence of different measures 
of self-control, helping the field to understand both the 
theoretical nature and suitable measurement approaches 
of the construct better.
Note
 1 Fleeson (2001) did not examine this idea with trait 
self-control specifically, but with other traits like 
agreeableness, extraversion, or conscientiousness 
(the latter being conceptually closely related to trait 
self-control).
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